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THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE AND
WORLD FOOD SECURITY
David Blandford*
INTRODUCTION
In 1996, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of
the United Nations held a World Food Summit that developed a Plan
of Action for food security, so that “all people, at all times, have
physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food
to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and
healthy life.”1 The Organization also made a Declaration that its
members would “strive to ensure that food, agricultural trade and
overall trade policies are conducive to fostering food security for all
through a fair and market-oriented world trade system.”2
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), food
security is defined as “physical and economic access to food that

* David Blandford, Professor of Agricultural and Environmental
Economics, Department of Agricultural Economics, Sociology and Education,
Penn State University. Formerly the head of a unit at the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development responsible for analyzing the impact of
agricultural policies on agricultural trade and assessing the outlook for world
agricultural markets.
1 Rome Declaration on World Food Security and World Food Summit Plan of
Action, FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N. (Nov. 13-17, 1996),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/w3613e/w3613e00.htm#PoA.
2 Id.
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meets people’s dietary needs as well as their food preferences.”3
Food security is built on three pillars:
•

Availability: sufficient quantities of food available on a
consistent basis.

•

Access: sufficient resources to obtain appropriate foods for a
nutritious diet.

•

Use: appropriate use based on knowledge of basic nutrition
and care, as well as adequate water and sanitation.4

This essay will focus on the economics of food insecurity,
with an emphasis on supply and demand. Food economics is
particularly pertinent for developing countries, as the world’s poorest
countries face the greatest food challenges. This essay will address
whether rules imposed on countries’ domestic agricultural and trade
policies through international agreements administered by the World
Trade Organization (WTO) limit the ability of developing countries
to achieve food security. In answering this question, this essay will
examine the causes of food insecurity and policy approaches
economists advocate for addressing the issues.
I. FOOD INSECURITY
Two major causes of food insecurity are insufficient
availability and lack of access to food.5 Insufficient availability can be
temporary and short-term. It can result, for example, from the
destruction of crops and livestock or the infrastructure needed to
distribute food. Droughts, floods, outbreaks of animal or plant
diseases, and excessively cold or hot temperatures can cause losses of
agricultural output. In some countries, hurricanes, typhoons,
3 Food Security, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story028/en/.
4 Id.
5 Hunger, WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME,
http://www.wfp.org/hunger/causes (last visited Sept. 19, 2014).
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volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and their aftermath (like tsunamis)
also lead to such losses. Natural disasters often severely damage or
destroy essential food transport and storage infrastructure. Shortterm disruptions in supply are also caused by wars and conflict, and,
regrettably, conflicts are often a continuing problem for ensuring
reliable food supplies.
Addressing short-term disruptions in poor countries’ food
supplies typically involves emergency aid and assistance. Many
countries, including the United States, have food aid programs.
Numerous non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are also active
in this area, such as Oxfam and the U.N. World Food Program
(WFP). Oxfam is an association of seventeen non-governmental
organizations that provides disaster relief in more than ninety
countries. The organization has been involved in providing clean
water, food, and sanitation in response to most of the world’s major
humanitarian crises over the last seventy years.6 The WFP, which
was created as part of the United Nations system in 1961, is the
world’s largest humanitarian organization. The WFP acts as a
channel for food assistance using funding provided by governments,
corporations, and private individuals. Each year, the WFP provides
food assistance to more than eighty million people in seventy-five
countries.7
Over the long term, insufficient food availability can be
caused by a persistent failure to produce enough food or to make
food available to those who need it. Availability problems can be
caused by resource constraints that limit agricultural productivity and
market failures, such as the lack of an institutional framework to
underpin increases in productivity in agriculture, inadequate access
for farmers to inputs needed to increase productivity, or the lack of
infrastructure to store, process, and move agricultural products to
where they are needed.

6 Who We Are, OXFAM INT’L, http://www.oxfam.org/en/about (last
visited Sept. 19, 2014).
7 Fighting Hunger Worldwide, WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME,
http://www.wfp.org/about (last visited Sept. 19, 2014).
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The inability of consumers to obtain access to food can be
temporary, as discussed above. For countries with sufficient financial
resources, imports can address these short-term reductions in
domestic supplies. For instance, a recent assessment by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture concluded that “the capacity to pay for
imports is significant in regions like Latin America and the Caribbean
and North Africa that import a large share of their food supplies.”8
Access to international markets can also help reduce price spikes
created by short-term reductions in domestic supply.9 Sustained
import dependence, however, means that rises in international food
prices affect domestic markets. When consumers spend a large
portion of their disposable income on food, price jumps can lead to
hardship and social unrest.
For example, the most recent
information available from the United Nations (2007-09) shows that
dependency on imports of cereals in Africa is roughly double the
average for developing countries as a whole (30.1 percent of total
supplies, compared to 15.5 percent).10 Since 2000, cereal prices in
Africa have been more than twice as volatile as the world average.
The poorest people in Africa (lowest income quintile) typically spend
between fifty and eighty percent of their disposable income on food,
compared to less than twenty percent in the United States.11 Sharp
increases in food prices in 2007-2008 led to riots in a number of
African countries, including Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Senegal,
Somalia and Yemen. Over the longer term, persistent inability to gain
access to food is generally caused by a lack of resources needed to
produce food for consumption or an inability to generate the income
necessary to purchase food through the marketplace.
STACEY ROSEN ET AL., A Report Summary from the Economic Research
Service, in INTERNATIONAL FOOD SECURITY ASSESSMENT, 2014-2024 (2014),
http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/1499869/gfa25_final-0708.pdf.
9
See FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., THE STATE OF FOOD
INSECURITY IN THE WORLD: HOW DOES INTERNATIONAL PRICE VOLATILITY
AFFECT DOMESTIC ECONOMIES AND FOOD SECURITY? 4 (2011),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/014/i2330e/i2330e.pdf.
10
Food Security Indicators, FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N.,
http://www.fao.org/economic/ess/ess-fs/ess-fadata/en/#.VNf_VnacM9d (last
updated Sept. 16, 2014).
11
Id.
8
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Both forms of food insecurity—temporary and chronic—can
be addressed through appropriate policies. As noted, short-term
food security issues can be addressed through short-term measures to
increase food availability. International aid, financial resources for
imports, and assistance in rebuilding damaged infrastructure can all
help overcome short-term food insecurity. In contrast, from an
economic perspective, the two most effective ways to address the
long-term resource inadequacy issue should be domestic.12 These
include:
•

Improving access to resources needed by individuals to
produce their own food (e.g., land and water). This usually
requires structural changes, such as land ownership reform
and the creation of a legal framework to guarantee property
rights.

•

Improving the productivity of existing resources through the
adoption of new technology, and improved land and resource
management for food production.

From an economic perspective, long-term access to food can also be
addressed effectively in two ways:
•

Improving the income earning capacity of food insecure
individuals.

•

Providing income transfers to the poor to enable them to
gain improved access to food.

Governments use other approaches in attempting to provide
food security. The most popular approach is to provide subsidies to
farmers to induce them to produce more food. Governments also
use measures that protect farmers from international competition so
that more food will be produced domestically rather than imported.
This is where trade law plays a role.
This conclusion is drawn from my interpretation based on economic
theory and the overall body of literature in this area. See generally C. PETER TIMMER,
WALTER P. FALCON & SCOTT R. PEARSON, FOOD POLICY ANALYSIS (1983).
12
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II. THE ROLE OF WTO DISCIPLINES
The Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) that resulted from the
Uruguay Round of negotiations under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), completed in 1994, sought to impose
disciplines on measures used by governments to protect agriculture,
i.e., the provision of price and income support to farmers and the use
of various types of subsidies, particularly trade-distorting subsidies.13
The Uruguay Round Agreement (URA) and the creation of the WTO
represented the first time that agricultural policies had been seriously
addressed multilaterally, as the GATT was largely ineffective in this
area.14 The AoA was negotiated at a time when international prices
for food were low and a major aim was to limit the price-depressing
effect of support measures used by wealthy countries.15 These
measures reduced the earning potential of farmers who did not
receive subsidies (in both exporting and importing countries)—but,
paradoxically, consumers in import-dependent low-income countries
benefited from the lower prices.16
Agricultural support was classified into three categories:
“amber box,” “green box,” and “blue box.”17 The two most
important categories were trade distorting amber box subsidies and
green box subsidies considered to be minimally trade distorting.18
Limits were placed on amber box subsidies and reductions were

13 See generally DAVID ORDEN, DAVID BLANDFORD & TIM JOSLING,
WTO DISCIPLINES ON AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT: SEEKING A FAIR BASIS FOR
TRADE (2011) (providing an in-depth analysis of international agreements on
agricultural subsidies).
14 See TIMOTHY E. JOSLING, STEFAN TANGERMANN & T.K. WARLEY,
AGRICULTURE IN THE GATT (2d ed., 1996).
15 See id.
16 ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., NATIONAL POLICIES
AND AGRICULTURAL TRADE (1987).
17 Agriculture Negotiations: Background Fact Sheet, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Oct.
1, 2002), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agboxes_e.pdf.
18 Id.
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agreed to in the total amount of subsidy that could be provided.19 De
minimis exemptions were granted for amounts of subsidies that were
viewed to be sufficiently small.20 Green box subsidies were exempt
from reductions.21
Developing countries are treated more generously in the
types of subsidies that can be excluded from WTO disciplines.
Specifically, investment subsidies made available to agriculture as part
of development programs, and subsidies for agricultural inputs for
low-income or resource-poor producers (measures that could be used
to increase productivity and food output by smaller and poorer
farmers), are exempt from reductions.22 The de minimis level for the
exclusion of subsidies from WTO calculations of support is set at ten
percent for developing countries, in contrast to five percent for other
countries.23
Green box subsidies are not subject to limits on the amount
of support provided. Several types of expenditures that are directly
relevant to food security policies are exempt from limits under the
AoA. These are summarized briefly below:
•

Expenditures on general government services, including
research, training and extension, pest control, inspection
services, and infrastructure (capital expenditures). Such
expenditures can be used to increase productivity and the

19 WTO Agriculture Negotiations: The Issues, and Where We Are Now, WORLD
TRADE ORG. (Dec. 1, 2004),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd13_boxes_e.htm.
20 Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, Jan. 1, 1995, 1867
U.N.T.S. 410 [hereinafter Uruguay Round Agreement]. Subsidies that involved
limitations on production were included in the blue box; these subsidies were not
limited in the AoA.
21 Id.
22 Domestic Support: The Conceptual Framework, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_intro03_domestic_e.htm#othe
r_exempt (last visited Sept. 19, 2014).
23 Uruguay Round Agreement, supra note 20.
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resilience of the food system to external shocks, such as
weather and disease.24
•

The accumulation and holding of private or public stocks,
which are part of a national food security program. There are
conditions, e.g., there must be predetermined targets for stock
accumulation relating solely to food security objectives, there
must be financial transparency, and purchases and sales must
be made at current market prices. Stockholding under this
provision could be used to provide a buffer against
fluctuations in supply due to weather, disease, or other
factors.25

•

Expenditures on domestic food aid programs with clearly
defined nutritional objectives and eligibility criteria for
recipients. The direct distribution of food to eligible
individuals and sales at subsidized prices are both permitted,
provided the government acquires supplies of food at market
prices. Financial transparency is also required.26

•

Government subsidies for income insurance and income
safety net programs. These are allowed, subject to defined
criteria relating to eligibility for recipients and limits on the
amount of compensation provided. Compensation must not
be linked to the type or volume of production so that the
subsidies do not provide an incentive to increase production,
i.e., act as a production subsidy.27

•

Disaster relief payments to farmers. Such payments are
permissible, provided they are linked to the effects of a
recognizable natural disaster (e.g., drought or flood). There

24
25
26
27

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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are limits, however, on the amount of compensation that can
be provided for losses of crops or livestock.28
The menu of policy options for pursuing food security
policies implied by this list of exemptions is broad. Measures exist
that both address short and long term food availability issues and
increase access by poor consumers. Policies have to be targeted and
proportionate, and they have to be minimally distorting in terms of
production and international trade. The framers of the AoA
recognized that governments would often want to implement food
security policies, and provided a means to do so in a way that would
be minimally trade distorting.29
III. ARE WTO DISCIPLINES INCONSISTENT WITH FOOD SECURITY?
Despite the fact that the AoA allows the use of a range of
policy measures directed toward ensuring food security, some
developing countries, e.g., India, argue that the requirements of these
policy measures under the AoA are unduly restrictive.30 These
countries want to have the ability to use policies that would not
satisfy the criteria specified in the AoA. It is important to stress that
the most economically efficient methods for addressing food
insecurity are not currently affected by the AoA, nor would they be
affected by a proposed new agreement on agriculture under the
current Doha Round of trade negotiations through the WTO. What
are currently affected, and would be affected by a new agreement,
however, are some policy measures used in the name of food
security.
The first such category of measures is general subsidies for
agricultural inputs, i.e., subsidies that are provided to all farmers,
Id.
This observation is based on the author’s conversations with some of
those involved in the negotiations.
30 Minister Sharma Explains India’s Position on Food Security, THIRD WORLD
NETWORK, http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/resurgence/2014/281282/cover05.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2014).
28
29
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rather than being targeted to low income or resource-poor farmers.
The targeted subsidies are permissible under the AoA. General input
subsidies on items such as fertilizer, agro-chemicals, energy, and
water are undesirable for two main reasons. First, they tend to
promote the over-use of inputs. Lowering the cost of fertilizer or
energy, for example, induces farmers to use more of these inputs
than needed. The excessive use of fertilizer, agro-chemicals, water,
and energy often has undesirable environmental consequences.31
Second, input subsidies are most advantageous to farmers that use
large quantities of inputs, such as those who operate larger farms.
From a distributional perspective, general input subsidies are less
desirable than subsidies targeted solely to small or disadvantaged
farmers.32
The second category of measures is price supports. Typically,
price supports are implemented by setting a minimum price for
agricultural products in the domestic market, which is maintained
through government purchases when supplies exceed demand at that
price. The purchases are stored and either disposed of domestically
or, if domestic disposal is not possible, exported using various forms
of export subsidies.33 Some countries argue for this approach on the
grounds that some of the products acquired can be distributed to
domestic consumers at subsidized prices.34 Unlike a system of
concessional distribution based on the acquisition of products at
market prices, however, purchases through price support programs
almost inevitably end up with the government acquiring larger stocks
than it needs, or can handle, through food assistance programs.35
Often, overproduction results in the disposal of excess purchases

DEPT. OF FOOD AND PUBLIC DISTRIB., http://dfpd.nic.in/ (last visited
Sept. 24, 2014).
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. (stating that the most important example is India).
35 Munisamy Gopinath, India, in DAVID ORDEN, DAVID BLANDFORD &
TIM JOSLING, WTO DISCIPLINES ON AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT: SEEKING A FAIR
BASIS FOR TRADE 277-309 (2011).
31
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through subsidized exports.36 Another drawback of price support
programs is that they keep prices higher for consumers who do not
have access to food distributions from government stocks and obtain
their food in the marketplace. It seems strange to have a policy that
is billed as ensuring food security that actually imposes higher costs
for food on consumers.
A third category of measures, which are not part of the
domestic support disciplines, relates to market access provisions.
This category covers various forms of import protection, such as
import tariffs and other related policies (often essential when a price
support program is in operation so that domestic support prices are
not undermined by cheaper imports), which also impose a tax on
domestic consumers of food.37 Like price supports, a policy making
food more expensive for consumers is a rather strange approach to
ensuring food security.
The existing WTO disciplines on agriculture, and proposals
to strengthen these (e.g., to reduce the permitted amount of tradedistorting support), are far from perfect. An important conclusion,
however, is that WTO rules affecting domestic policies designed to
ensure food security are on the right track. WTO rules discourage
the use of inefficient and costly policies that often have undesirable
side effects on consumers and environmental quality, but at the same
time allow countries to pursue food security policies that do not have
such effects.
Food stockholding was a major focus of a ministerial meeting
of the WTO in Bali, Indonesia in December 2013.38 Countries with
stockholding policies that do not conform to current WTO green
The AoA imposes restrictions on the use of explicit export subsidies,
but there are loopholes that allow various forms of disguised subsidies to dispose
of surplus products internationally. These loopholes include subsidized financing
and insurance for exports, as well as food aid, which are not covered by the AoA.
37 See NATIONAL POLICIES AND AGRICULTURAL TRADE, supra note 16.
38 See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 6 December 2013,
WT/MIN(13)/W/10, 1 (2013)
https://mc9.wto.org/system/files/documents/w10_1.pdf.
36
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box criteria, and whose expenditures on stockholding would be
counted against their allowable amber box support, pressed for a
permanent exemption for their policies.39 A temporary solution was
agreed to, under which WTO members will not challenge countries
whose domestic support exceeds current bindings as a result of the
way their stockholding policies operate.40 If the WTO’s principal
objective to reduce trade-distorting support for agriculture is to be
maintained, it will be important that any modification to existing rules
on stockholding for food security purposes does not provide for
open-ended price support for farmers, i.e., unlimited purchases at a
government-determined price.
CONCLUSION
We have seen from past experience in Europe and the United
States that this type of policy is economically inefficient, and a
potential source of tension among trading partners because of
resulting distortions in international markets. A subsidy war between
the European Union and the United States during the 1970s and
1980s was one the major reasons why countries thought it was
necessary to bring agricultural policies under international disciplines
in the Uruguay Round.41 It would be unfortunate for the world’s
trading system if a loosening of these disciplines resulted in renewed
conflicts over agricultural policies in the future.

39
40
41

Id.
Id.
See JOSLING, TANGERMANN & WARLEY, supra note 14.
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